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Internet researchers increasingly have at their disposal of an array of automated software 
agents, or “bots,” which can rapidly and efficiently retrieve a variety of economic and 
technical data from publicly accessible web sites.  While these automated tools greatly 
facilitate the retrieval and analysis of data for academic research, they may pose ethical 
problems for Internet researchers.  Specifically, automated software bots place some load 
on servers being accessed, possibly in contradiction to the expected use of such servers, 
and possibly in violation of the legal prerogatives of web site owners.  Determining how 
and when to access such web sites, and whether to seek the consent of web site owners 
for retrieval of publicly accessible data presents an apparent conflict between general 
principles of information policy and the emerging legal precedent regarding trespass to 
computers. This conflict may be characterized as pitting utilitarian considerations against 
deontological considerations in a fashion reminiscent of previous debates over informed 
consent in on-line research.  In this paper, we examine both utilitarian and deontological 
characterizations of the ethical obligations of researchers employing automated data 
retrieval bots, and argue that the contrasts between the two approaches do not necessarily 
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result in conflict.  Instead, we argue that the tension within the relevant practices 
indicates the need for a “meta-choice” between utilitarian and deontological 
considerations.  We further suggest certain factors that may differentiate such a “meta-
ethical” choice in the context of automated data retrieval from the “meta-ethical” choice 
presented in previously identified contexts of human subjects research or of web browser 
technology design. In the end, we argue that by analyzing the ethical issues in terms of 
the contrast between utilitarian and deontological ethics, it is possible to resolve some of 




The growing popularity of the Internet as a means of communication has significant 
ramifications for academic researchers. Not only does the Internet facilitate traditional 
research efforts by enabling remote collaboration, it also provides new ways to 
accomplish old tasks and opens important new avenues for research. Moreover, the 
Internet, and the behavior of individuals and firms interacting with it, has itself become 
an area of academic research. As researchers study the behavior of individuals and 
organizations in electronic environments, the Internet itself facilitates access to large 
amounts of on-line data generated by these activities. Examples of such data sets include 
the prices and offerings of competitors in electronic marketplaces and the behavior of 
both sellers and buyers in electronic auctions. The amount of data available on the web 
pages of target sites leads researchers to look for automated procedures for data 
collection. Not only does an automated approach allow larger amounts of data to be 
collected more accurately, and in a shorter period of time than can be accomplished 
manually, it also provides for the reliable gathering of longitudinal data. Automated 
Internet data collection agents have recently been used by several researchers in various 
domains (e.g., Clay, Krishnan, & Wolff, 2001; Clemons, Hann, & Hitt, 2002; Baye & 
Morgan, 2001; Pan, Ratchford, & Shankar, 2002; Shankar, Ratchford, & Pan, 2002; 
Kauffman & Wood, 2000; Hahn 2001).  Much of the research facilitated by these agents 
would be impossible or impractical without such tools. 
However, at the same time that they open and facilitate new avenues of research, 








automated agents that make them most appealing for research use also raise issues as to 
their impact upon targeted web sites. Although the ethics of on-line research has gained 
increasing attention by individuals, governments, and professional organizations (such as 
AoIR, Association of Internet Researchers), we are to date unaware of any literature 
addressing the ethical standards for use of automated agents. However, the salient 
features of automated data collection have been the subject of legal scrutiny, particularly 
in the United States. Consequently, because law frequently incorporates moral or ethical 
norms, in this paper we examine the relevant legal precedent for indications as to the 
ethics of automated data retrieval. 
In doing so, we encounter an apparent conflict within the applicable current legal 
standards and researcher’s response to those standards. From the standpoint of applied 
ethics, two different sorts of arguments appear here – i.e., utilitarian and deontological.  
In contrast to a utilitarian cost-benefit approach, deontological approaches emphasize the 
primary – and (more or less) absolute – importance of basic rights, duties, obligations, 
etc.  In the following, we explain more carefully what these approaches entail in the 
context of automated data collection, and then analyze the conflicting approaches vis-à-
vis the emerging legal positions, specification, and practices. Doing so may help us 
evaluate this conflict on a second, perhaps more fruitful level. By analyzing the divided 
approaches within this larger framework, we hope to show that the apparent conflicts 
between the various emerging law and practices, is in an important sense just that –
apparent. From a larger perspective, the apparent conflict more fundamentally reflects a 
deep difference between general principles of legal doctrine and research policy as 
utilitarian, whereas the positions of emerging law, specifications, and practices may be 
viewed as deontological. In this light, the conflicts between these two positions require a 
second level “meta-ethical” debate over which of these two positions should be give 
more weight in the case of conflict. 
We begin by describing the nature of the research tools employed in automated 
data retrieval and the types of research implicated by these tools. We then outline the 
ethical problem presented by this type of research, and review the legal precedent that 
might be applied to this research activity. We note in particular that legal policy and 








characterized as, respectively, utilitarian and deontological in nature. This leads us to 
examine the extent to which legal doctrine may be relied upon to guide or indicate good 
ethical practice in these circumstances.  
Automated Data Retrieval Robots 
Automated Internet data collection agents are simply computer programs designed to 
interact with web servers via the Internet to collect various kinds of data (Kauffman, 
March, & Wood, 2000). Because they retrieve information on behalf of humans and 
operate in an environment designed for human interaction, they are often referred to as 
software agents, or simply agents.  Computer programs that automatically retrieve 
information from Internet web sites have been called robots (or "bots" for short).  For 
several reasons, we shall refer to such programs as bots or robots through the remainder 
of this discussion, and avoid the term agent although it is quite common.  We believe that 
term “agent” is significant and somewhat loaded for at least two and possibly three 
reasons, relating to both connotational and denotational valences of the term as it has 
been used in other contexts.   
The first of these derives from the legal concept of agency.  Under the law of 
agency, an individual, or principal, may designate and authorize another to act on his or 
her behalf, managing the principal’s property or interests, entering legally binding 
relationships, and for that matter incurring liability as if the principal had acted 
personally.  A large body of law has developed to define and govern the use and misuse 
of such delegated action.  Human agents under the law of agency are typically expected 
to act according to the instructions of the principal, effectively as extensions of the 
principal’s will.  Of course, having their own independent will, legal agents do not 
always act precisely according to instruction, which may sometimes work to advantage to 
the principal, for example when unforeseen circumstances arise.  This may also work to 
the principal’s detriment when the agent makes a mistake or exercises poor judgment 
within the scope of his authority.  Or, the agent may act in his own interests rather than 
that of the principal, and a good portion of the law of agency considers the redress 








Software agents at the present state of technology typically do not behave 
independent of their programming, although they may of course malfunction.  But we see 
no reason that the lack of independent behavior would necessarily preclude software 
robots from being legally regarded as precisely instructed and faithfully executing agents.  
Indeed, as electronic data interchange and other form of automated commerce have 
become more common, the legal consequences of programmed commercial instructions 
have become routinely imputed to whoever deployed that program. 
In a different, non-legal sense, the term “agent” may also refer to a discrete causal 
entity.  The epidemiologist may speak of etiological agents, or the historian of agents of 
change.  In this sense, agents may be sentient and animate, or they may be insensate and 
inanimate.  Volitional action is not necessarily within the valence of the word in this 
sense.  Such a view of agency likely reaches its apex in actor-network theory (ANT) 
where the causal agents, or actants, contributing to a particular social phenomenon are 
not sorted by volition or sentience; neither human nor non-human causes are privileged in 
the causal analysis.  
Software robots may surely be agents in this sense of the word, whether or not 
they are legal agents.  But we also note that an entity, or causal agent, need not be an 
agent in the legal sense to incur liability or other legal responsibility on behalf of another.  
The owners of mobile but non-living agencies, such as confined waters on a landowner’s 
property, or noxious fumes, may be held liable for the damage done by such causal 
agents when those agents are accidentally or purposely released.  Similarly the owners of 
living but non-sentient agents, such as livestock, may be liable for the damage done by 
such agents when they are released or escape confinement. 
It may well be that software robots might be said to act as agents in these two 
senses of the word, but neither is necessary for our analysis here.  In particular, we do not 
propose to explore the legal agency of such robots, given that legal agency is not 
necessary to incur liability.  We sidestep these issues, and for that matter the term “agent” 
in part because an analysis of legal agency is not our purpose here, but more because we 
are aware that lurking behind each of these uses of “agency” lies a third use of the term 








complex question going to questions of cognition and personhood.  We recognize that a 
sufficiently complex software robot might either possess agency in this meaning of the 
term, or behave in such a manner that was indistinguishable from the exercise of such 
agency.   It is less clear that a software agent of the sort we are considering is sufficiently 
complex to rise to this level.  In this paper we focus on the ethics of programming and 
deploying software robots as the technology currently exists, which means that we focus 
on the ethical situation of the programmer or researcher using the technology.  We expect 
consideration of the software robot as an independent ethical entity will someday come, 
but today is not that day.1  
Whatever their potential legal or moral status, the software robots we consider 
here are programmed to retrieve web pages and parse them to find data to be stored for 
analysis, for references to images to be downloaded, and for links to other web pages that 
might contain useful information.  Because such data collection bots have the capability 
to simulate data being entered into a web form, such as a customer order form, and posted 
by a user, they can dynamically interact with electronic commerce web servers and 
collect detailed data about various practices and behaviors in the online environment. 
Many programming environments provide tools for the development of such agents, so 
they are becoming increasingly easier to develop and deploy in meaningful ways (Allen 
& March, 2000). 
Data collection bots vary widely in their architecture and sophistication. They can 
retrieve documents in either a serial or parallel fashion. When an agent data collection bot 
requests a page from a web server, it typically takes much longer to retrieve the page than 
it does to parse into data elements and process it for the data of interest. If a data 
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collection bot agent processes its requests serially, that is, waiting for the first request to 
be retrieved and parsed before the second request is issued, it places a much lower burden 
on the web server with which it is interacting than an agent that issues requests for a large 
number of pages with no delays and parses them after they have all been received.  Data 
collection agents’ bots can also be built to operate in a distributed manner in which 
several copies of a bot agent can be running simultaneously on different computers, all 
working together to complete the same data collection task. Because these bots are 
designed to interact with web servers over the Internet, they are easily adapted to 
cooperate with each other over the same channel, making it relatively easy to deploy 
massively parallel, geographically dispersed distributed data collection networks with 
hundreds or thousands of nodes.  
Data collection bots for academic research typically have a predefined set of data 
to collect. This set may be defined by a specified set of Internet sites or URLs as targets 
for requests, a particular description of a set of products, such as a set of ISBN numbers, 
or by some third-party list, such as “the Billboard 200” list of popular music recordings. 
In any case, the set of desired data items are specified in an unambiguous, targeted 
manner. Data collection bots are often deployed to gather data that is changing with some 
degree of regularity. Data collection bots have some important differences from resource 
discovery bots.  For example, a resource discovery bot may be used to discover and index 
the page that holds price information for a particular product being offered by a particular 
vendor. In doing this, the resource discovery bot seeks the location of the page, but is not 
concerned with the actual price, which may change frequently. The data collection bot is 
likely to be used to collect the price at specified intervals so a researcher can gather a 
longitudinal data set for use in analyzing Internet pricing. This requires that data 
collection bots make frequent return-visits to particular documents. 
When academic researchers deploy automated data collection bots, they can 
collect very large amounts of data in relatively short periods of time, but this power 
comes at a cost—a cost only partly borne by the researcher. Both data collection bots and 
resource discovery bots employed by search engines such as Yahoo, Google, or Altavista, 
use the resources of web servers in ways that may not have been intended by the owners 








load on the equipment of the owners or hosting agent of the web site. In particular, 
deployment of automated data collection bots allows significantly more requests than 
would be feasible by individual consumers or Internet users requesting the data manually.  
As a result, there has been some discussion (e.g. Kostner, 1995) regarding the appropriate 
place of such data collection agents in the Internet community. 
Foundation for Ethical Concern 
The expectations of individuals posting information on the Internet are critical to this 
analysis. When individuals or organizations make information available through the 
World Wide Web, absent some type of password or access protection, they are making 
that information accessible to the public. As with other means of putting information 
before the public, such as publishing a book or making a television broadcast, there is 
some cost associated with placing the information in a particular format. However, with 
such traditional channels, incremental costs of accessing information are borne solely by 
those retrieving the information as individuals buy or share books and as they buy 
necessary hardware to receive a television broadcast. This is not the case in an electronic 
environment. After individuals and organizations invest in the necessary computer 
hardware or subscribe to the necessary services to be able to post information on the 
World Wide Web, there is a continual and incremental cost associated with responding to 
individual requests for information. These response costs are not simple variable costs 
that vary directly with each use. They are step-variable in nature, so that a single added 
request adds almost nothing to the total cost, but a significant increase in accesses 
requires a significant step up of response facilities. In other words, the infrastructure 
necessary to support 10,000,000 requests per day is more expensive than that required to 
support 1,000 requests per day. Thus, although the requester of information pays part of 
the incremental cost of processing a request for data by spending resources to make the 
request, the supplier of the information pays the remainder of the cost in answering the 
request. 
There are a variety of reasons that those placing information in an electronic 
public arena are willing to bear both the up-front and incremental costs. It may be 








directly through their electronic storefront or through their traditional channels), or it may 
be just because of an altruistic desire to help humanity. Whatever the reason, it is almost 
certainly based on the premise that when a request is served, a human reader will be 
exposed to the information on the page, or that there will be some other positive 
externality of the interaction. For example, when an Internet search engine such as 
Google, Altavista, Excite, or Yahoo deploys a resource discovery bot that requests a page 
from a web server, the individual or organization that ultimately bears the cost for 
responding to the request hopes to gain a second-order benefit. Although no human will 
be directly exposed to the information served as the response, it will be indexed and 
ultimately made more accessible as individuals querying the search engine become aware 
of the document contents and are referred back to its source. Thus, when a search engine 
employs a bot to gather data from various websites they consume some resources of the 
site, but they provide second-order benefits in return. 
This is not the case when an academic researcher deploys a data collection bot. As 
the bot executes its task, it consumes the resources of various web servers, and typically 
reciprocates with virtually no benefit. Although there may be a second-order benefit from 
published research that brings awareness to a particular website, there is no guarantee that 
such publicity will be favorable to the site. Accordingly, the use of Internet data 
collection bots constitutes a form of social free riding—the taking of a benefit without 
paying the associated cost. Significantly, this cost may not have been the cost anticipated 
by the site, or a cost that the purveyors of the site would necessarily be willing to bear if 
asked.  
Researchers may of course allay such concerns by requesting permission to access 
the site, allowing the owner or operator of a web site the opportunity to voluntarily 
assume the additional load that comes from academic data retrieval. However, such 
requests have their own costs, slowing the pace of research and possibly negating the 
advantages of data retrieval automation. Additionally, in much the same way that people 
behave differently when they know they are being observed, websites may present 
different information if they know they are being examined for purposes of an academic 
study. If there is reason to believe that a site, once aware of the study, would tailor the 








notify the organization of the study through a request for express consent. And of course, 
some web site owners may well decline to grant permission for research activities that 
will accrue little or no benefit to them. Thus the academic researcher faces a dilemma: 
even though the data collected is ostensibly publicly available, the method of collection 
may well raise an ethical concern and the most obvious method of allaying that 
concern—consent—may well seriously hamper research efforts. 
Established Legal Precedent 
The problem of free riding on Internet servers has not gone unnoticed in commercial 
contexts, and courts have already begun to formulate legal standards for such activity 
(O’Rourke, 2000; Elkin-Koren, 2001). These decisions have sounded in a range of legal 
doctrines, including federal and state statutory prohibitions against “unauthorized access” 
to networked computers. Copyright claims have been less successful. Other, as yet 
untried legal theories could be imagined as the basis for website exclusion, such as 
theories of unfair competition, or, in the EU, statutes protecting database rights. But to 
date, by far the most successful legal claim asserted against on-line automated data 
gathering has been based on a theory of trespass to chattels, that is, to moveable property. 
Several courts have now embraced this renovated legal theory, revising its classical 
elements into a new type of tort claim adapted to the context of the Internet. 
At common law, a claim of trespass to chattels required interference with or 
dispossession of the chattel, resulting in some harm or damage to the chattel, or pecuniary 
loss to the owner. This definition of trespass has been reformulated for networked 
computers to hold that electrical impulses satisfy the common law requirement of 
physical contact, and the increased load on the networked system qualifies as interference 
or dispossession. Harm or pecuniary loss is often presumed from the loss of processing 
cycles or the diversion of data storage capacity. For example, in eBay v. Bidder’s Edge, a 
United States District Court relied on a theory of trespass to enjoin Bidder’s Edge, an 
aggregator of on-line auction data, from automated collection of data from the eBay site. 
Similarly, in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, a trespass theory was used to penalize the 
automated collection of ownership data from a publicly accessible domain name 








the producer of software used to search in real time for air fares on airline websites, on a 
theory of “contributory trespass,” that is, aiding and abetting others to trespass on the 
airlines website. 
Each of these decisions has hinged in large measure upon the question of notice, 
and of authorization. Harmful contact with the chattel only constitutes a trespass if the 
contact is unauthorized, and at least some types of contact with computer servers can be 
inferred to have been implicitly authorized by interconnection with the Internet. Why else 
connect the server to the network, making the site publicly available, unless contact, at 
least some type of contact is desired? Like any other license, implied licenses have some 
limit, and can be revoked or overridden by an explicit license. The question then becomes 
the extent of the implied license to access the server, and the ability of the owner to 
explicitly limit or revoke such implied authorization. 
Courts have inferred such limits, or alternatively found such revocation, in the 
actions of the site owner or in the terms of certain publicly available documents. 
Specifically, terms of service posted on the website, forbidding certain types of access, 
have been held to constitute evidence of limitation or revocation. Similar evidence has 
been found in the presence on of the "robots.txt" file on a web server.  Written in 
conformance with the "Standard for Robot Exclusion" (Kostner, 1995), site of the 
“Standard for Robot Exclusion,” contained in a machine readable “robot.txt” file. This 
file, intended to limit crawling by resource discovery robots, can indicate to a properly 
programmed robot which pages the site owner wishes indexed and which pages the site 
owner does not want indexed. Robots need not be programmed to honor such automated 
requests, but their presence, and an indexing industry norm of doing so, has been taken as 
explicit permission or denial of site access. 
While the courts have almost universally embraced some form of exclusionary 
right for website owners, legal commentators have for the most part been highly skeptical 
of this trend. The initial and ongoing criticism of these cases has been largely based upon 
instrumental grounds: that the legal result will have deleterious effects on Internet 
activity, that it will result in an undesirable fragmentation of property rights on the 








one of us (Burk, 2000) has explicitly advocated that a legal cost-benefit analysis should 
be incorporated into the determination of such cases.  While a minority of commentators 
has applauded the development of these cases, their applause has also been based upon 
instrumental grounds: praising the assignment of property rights in web sites as necessary 
to the development of healthy licensing markets and efficient allocation of resources 
(Epstein, 2003; McGowan, 2004).  
A fairly clear example of such public policy occurs in the copyright area, where 
the United States Supreme Court has made clear that the U.S. constitution forbids 
intellectual property rights in unoriginal works, such as certain factual compilations, no 
matter how great the harm that may result to an individual’s interests from the refusal to 
extend such protection. In the seminal Feist v. Rural Telephone case, the United States 
Supreme Court held that copying of a telephone book’s white pages is not only 
permissible under copyright law, but that copyright law cannot be extended to prevent 
such copying even should Congress wish to do so -- despite the effort and investment that 
might have gone into creating the telephone book, it is free for the taking. The 
constitutional public interest in access to factual information is too great to allow such 
access to be restricted by copyright. Fair use offers another example from copyright 
where we allow unconsented use of another’s intellectual property, even to that 
individual’s detriment, in the overall interest of the public. This suggests that public 
policy dictates that publicly accessible data on web sites should be similarly appropriable. 
Indeed, a number of scholars are highly suspicious of the “trespass to computers” line of 
cases, as they appear to be an attempt to make an end run around copyright law, seeking 
protection for published data that could not be protected under copyright. 
Law as a Moral Compass 
In assessing the ethical implications of these arguments, we notice first note that they are 
distinctly utilitarian. Briefly, utilitarian ethics emphasize a kind of moral cost-benefit 
approach, so as to ask the question: do the probable benefits of an act outweigh its 
probable costs, in which case, it is morally justifiable – or do the costs outweigh the 
benefits, in which case, the act is not morally justifiable?  Indeed, the trespass cases 








recognizing an exclusionary right for website owners. This stems in part from the 
requirement of harm or impairment as an element of the tort, but to an even greater extent 
from the procedural posture of the decisions, which were largely concluded on motions 
for a preliminary injunction. Such motions occur very early in the litigation process, 
before complete information is available – for example, before there has been a complete 
determination of the rights of the plaintiff. Due to the incomplete information available to 
the court when granting preliminary relief, the calculus of factors in deciding the motion 
includes weighing the likely injury to the plaintiff if the injunction is improvidently 
denied against the likely injury to the defendant if the injunction is improvidently 
granted. 
This characterization is important to observe for several reasons. First of all, it is 
characteristic not only of U.S.-based approaches to intellectual property, but of U.S.-
based approaches to research ethics – in contrast with the more deontological approaches 
characteristic of Europe and Scandinavia, in both the areas of research ethics and of 
intellectual property (Burk, 2006).  Thus, the general policy of American information 
law, together with the practicalities of research practice, might lead one to conclude that 
the utilitarian cost-benefit approach comprises the preferred, or at least dominant 
methodology for analyzing the responsibility of researchers engaged in automated 
collection of publicly accessible data on-line, on-line data. 
But the material we have reviewed thus far may be quite differently characterized 
as pointing toward a quite different approach that may be described as deontological in 
nature. From a deontological perspective, the right of a human being to informed consent 
might be held to be absolute – no matter how low the risks of harm may be. From this 
perspective, the right to informed consent cannot be overridden – especially from a cost-
benefit perspective that would try to argue that the benefits of so doing so outweigh 
possible costs and risks to the individual. From the deontological viewpoint, such cost-
benefit arguments, as framed by the belief that “the good of the many outweighs the good 
of the few,” thereby runs the risk of becoming a moral slippery slope that can quickly 
justify wholesale violation of human rights if such violation (against a few) would 








Courts have generally been willing to assume that unwanted electronic contact 
constitutes harm to a networked computer, creating an almost absolute right of exclusion 
against unwelcome file requests sent to otherwise publicly accessible computers – what 
might be characterized as a distinctly deontological claim directly challenging the 
utilitarian calculus suggested above -- namely, the webserver owner’s property rights, 
including the right to prohibit a researcher’s ‘bot from accessing the webserver and its 
data, where such access is construed as a form of trespass against the webserver as 
chattel. By the same token, to maintain an archive of web pages for the sake of research, 
if not authorized by the web page owners, could be construed as copyright infringement. 
At least in the U.S. context, this concern is perhaps secondary, insofar as such archives 
might be arguable under the fair use provisions of the copyright law. Either way, of 
course, we seem to be left with potentially strong deontological claims: these rights 
cannot be overridden by the possible benefits of research – no matter how great those 
benefits might be. In short, the server owner appears to enjoy the moral equivalent of the 
right to informed consent. This conclusion raises significant questions as to whether 
current legal precedent, together with practice of deploying the standard for robot 
exclusion in fact amounts to a deontological norm regarding web site data. 
The Morality of Law 
As an initial matter, we note several caveats as to whether an emerging legal practice, 
either deontological or utilitarian, can inform the ethical obligations of researchers. This 
consideration implicates a long and unresolved debate in jurisprudence as to whether law 
should be obeyed because it has independent moral force – that is, that the creation of law 
creates a moral imperative -- or whether law should be obeyed because it reflects moral 
consensus, especially in democracies where law at least in theory constitutes the 
consensus of society (Hart, 1994; Fuller, 1969).  To some extent, the question may turn to 
some extent on whether a particular law is malum prohibitum – for example, a regulatory 
rule for the convenience of the state, such as the 55 mile an hour speed limit, for which 
there is no reason to expect that a morally autonomous individual would inherently know 
this is the expected behavior – or malum in se – in an inherently moral rule, such as do 








is the expected behavior. One can advance a range of both natural law and utilitarian 
theories to support either view. But under either view, there is agreement that at least 
some of the time legal and ethical behavior will be correspond to one another. 
At the same time, it seems equally clear that an individual’s ethical and legal 
obligations may not be coterminous. In some instances, an individual’s ethical 
obligations may be seen to exceed his or her legal obligations. To take a famous example, 
under the Anglo-American common law of tort, there is in general no legal duty to rescue 
– if an individual sees someone else drowning face down in a puddle of water, and could 
save them at absolutely no risk and essentially no inconvenience to himself, he has 
absolutely no legal obligation to do so -- but almost certainly has a moral obligation to do 
so, and would rightly be considered morally degenerate if he did not.    
In other cases, one’s legal obligations may be seen to exceed her ethical 
obligations -- for example, in the area of research ethics, it seems likely that many IRB 
requirements for human subjects research arise out of a desire to avoid legal liability 
rather than out of any requirement of respect for research subject’s autonomy and 
welfare. At the extreme, it may in some instances even be necessary for an individual to 
engage in ethical acts that the law prohibits: hiding Jews from the Nazis, assisting 
escaped slaves on the Underground Railroad, or refusing to reveal subpoenaed sources of 
news information, for example. However, in general, many actions that depart radically 
from legal prohibitions will tend to be ethically questionable -- e.g., stalking or shooting 
abortionists in the belief that it is necessary in order to save fetuses from destruction. 
In many instances, disparities between legal and ethical behavior will arise from 
differing measures or conceptions of harm, where “harm” is defined very broadly. In 
some cases, harm will involve an intrusion on the rights of the individual, regardless of 
the general effect on the good of society, perhaps even in spite of an effect on the good of 
society – a largely deontological claim. In other cases, the harm at issue may accrue to 
society as a whole, perhaps all at once, or incrementally as repeated harms to the 
individual.  Deontological, rights-based claims may accrue out of instrumentalist 
motivations, as essentially per se categories of cost-benefit conclusions. Or, 








incompatible rights come into conflict. This continuum of analyses, from absolute 
deontological claims to absolute utilitarian claims indicates that law, like much of ethics, 
comprises an unusual admixture of utilitarian and deontological analysis. And, where one 
applies the ethics of deontology, but the law has chosen that of utilitarianism, or where 
one applies the ethics of utilitarianism when the law has chosen that of deontology, 
disparities occur. 
In some instances, legal standards may give us an indication of the type of activity 
society considers harmful or not harmful. For example, trespass to land has long been 
held to constitute a harm per se; that is, the violation of an individual’s control over land 
is a harm in itself, whether or not any actual physical damage was done to the property. 
To date, courts have tended to treat web sites much as they have traditionally treated 
land, being willing to assume harm, or to deter speculative potential harm, from 
unwanted electronic contact. This effectively makes unwanted electronic contact a harm 
in itself, without necessity of proving actual physical or financial harm. One reading of 
this line of cases is that society is willing to treat unwanted electronic contact as a per se 
category of harm that deserves ethical deference. 
At the same time, legal standards may indicate categories of harm against which 
society refuses to recognize or offer protection. Web site owners might be “harmed,” in 
the sense of receiving no direct benefit for their efforts, from the contact by researchers' 
data collection robots. But it is not quite correct to assert that automated research data 
retrieval constitutes free riding on the efforts or publicly accessible resources of web site 
creators. True, the web site owners will not get new business from the data retrieval as 
they might if the contact came from potential customers, nor will they get increased 
access and visibility as they might if the contact came from search engine or other 
indexing spiders’ resource discovery robots. The web site owners do benefit in some 
measure, along with the rest of society, from the generation of new knowledge and 
understanding. Indeed occasionally they may benefit very directly from research that 
generates results that enhances their understanding of consumer behavior, web marketing, 
or business strategies. The overall societal benefit of the research, in which the web site 








From a different conception of harm, web site owners might be “harmed” by the 
research contact to the extent that the published research also benefits their competitors, 
or reveals unsavory or inept practices in which they may be engaged. But it is unclear 
whether this latter type of harm constitutes harm that we should take into account in 
determining whether to refrain from conducting the research – damage to an undeserved 
reputation, or deterrence to an ill-advised activity, while constituting subjective harm 
from the web site owner’s point of view, may not be actual “harm” of the sort recognized 
by society at all. Society may prefer that poor business practices be exposed, even though 
such exposure prevents a web site owner from pursuing his preferred course of action. 
Stated differently, it is not clear that there is a strong right to exclude researcher scrutiny 
in order to continue to engage in fraud or waste – whatever deontological claim the web 
owners might have does not extend so far, or is outweighed by the harms they are 
inflicting upon society and upon themselves. 
The legal allowance for certain harms in the greater public interest, however, 
raises the question as to whether we are using individuals as a means to an end, rather 
than as an end in themselves, to the extent that we are regarding or disregarding their 
labor and creativity for broader social purposes. It is possible that it may be legally 
permissible, but still unethical, to appropriate certain types of information to the 
detriment of another. In other research contexts, it is likely that there is personal 
information that could be legally gathered, as it is subject to no recognized privacy or 
proprietary interest, but that gathering the information would disregard the research 
subject’s autonomy or personhood such that the research would constitute an unethical 
practice. A parallel situation could arise with regard to automated web data retrieval, 
although the method of gathering, rather than the nature of the data is more likely to raise 
ethical issues. 
Framing the “Meta-Ethical” Choice 
Bearing in mind the caveats we have indicated with regard to the moral content and 
implications of law, and noting particularly the legal admixture of utilitarian and 
deontological justifications for particular policies, we are better positioned to consider the 








research practice. To note that law and ethics mix deontology with their prevailing 
utilitarianism is by no means a critique. On the contrary, as the criticisms of utilitarianism 
noted above suggest, most ethicists argue that some combination of both utilitarianism 
and deontology is required for a more complete and robust ethical system. That is: the 
strengths of deontology may compensate for the deficits of consequentialism and vice-
versa. 
By noting this basic contrast in our moral thinking, we can often avoid 
unnecessary confusion – and, in some cases, resolve otherwise apparently irresolvable 
conflicts. In the case of automated data retrieval practice this conflict is not, as it may 
first appear, a conflict that pits utilitarian arguments against more or less equal arguments 
for a contrary view. Rather, the conflict here is more fundamental – namely, between a 
consistently utilitarian approach and basic deontological rights surrounding notions of 
property and express intentions. From this larger perspective, the two sets of arguments 
thus run the risk of simply being irrelevant to one another, insofar as each is grounded on 
distinct, and perhaps incommensurable starting points. More positively, however, this 
perspective suggests that the appearance of a commensurable conflict is just that – an 
appearance. By viewing the information policy arguments as consistently utilitarian, vis-
à-vis the countervailing positions as deontological, the debate shifts to a second “meta-
level” – one that forces us to ask: of these two ethical approaches per se, which should 
supersede the other in case of conflict? 
The Question of Consent 
The “meta-ethical” choice between utilitarian and deontological criteria is well illustrated 
by considering the questions of consent, implied consent, and informed consent in regard 
to automated data retrieval. Much of the legal analysis surrounding the trespass to 
computers cases hinges upon issues of consent: trespass occurs only if contact with the 
computer is unauthorized, and courts have been willing to infer some degree of 
authorization from the fact that the computers are connected to a publicly accessible 
network. Clearly the computer owners desire or permit some degree of contact with their 
computers, otherwise they could disconnect the machines from the network, or use 








However, such implied consent can be expressly revoked. Courts have found evidence of 
such revocation in the terms of service posted on some web sites, stating that certain 
types of access by bots is prohibited. The posting of “robot.txt” files, machine-readable 
files implementing the “standard for robot exclusion,” instructing bots to refrain from 
crawling all or part of a web site, has also been taken as evidence of revocation. 
To be sure, neither of these indicators of revocation may ever be actually seen by 
the individual deploying a software robot. Terms of service pages may be buried within 
web sites beneath several layers of linked pages; robot.txt files are not meant to be seen 
by a human at all, and do not necessarily contain any human-readable text are 
meaningless to individuals not already familiar with the standard. In such cases, the 
notice of revocation may be constructive rather than actual; it may be that the owner of 
the robot should have known of the explicit revocation of implied permission rather than 
did know of the explicit revocation of implied permission. Such a rule of constructive 
notice effectively shifts the burden of determination, placing the onus of investigating 
whether the robotic contact is permissible to the individuals deploying robots, rather than 
laying the burden of notification on the web site owner. 
This places a significant burden on the researcher employing software data 
collection bots; since copyright liability is strict, and a number of courts have treated 
liability for trespass to computers as similarly strict, the researcher may bear the full 
burden of examining the web site for signs of revocation. In the case of the robot.txt file, 
the indicator of explicit revocation may be automated, but software bots cannot read or 
comprehend human-readable terms of service postings.  If the terms of service or 
robots.txt file indicate that robot crawling is not permitted on the web site, the researcher 
may then bear the additional burden of seeking out and contacting a human agent to 
obtain explicit consent for the date retrieval. 
Requesting such consent of course entails costs and burdens on the researcher – 
including the risk of being rejected, thus seriously undermining one’s research from the 
outset. The trespass cases reviewed here include instances in which requests for 
permission to crawl a web site were explicitly denied, but commercial crawlers 








permission, as they would accrue to the public benefit. In the commercial context, courts 
have not tended to look kindly on such self-help in the face of explicit denials of 
permission. Researchers who do not seek consent from website owners similarly run the 
risk of knowingly violating the web site owner’s wishes and property rights. And an 
additional methodological concern is that requesting consent may pollute the data, for 
example causing the site operator to alter or mask information that may reflect poorly on 
the transactions or business model attending the site. 
This calculus of benefits and detriments is characteristic of the utilitarian 
approach, and the factors listed above suggest that such a cost-benefit analysis may 
proceed at different levels.  At one level, the level of public policy, the general benefit to 
society from might be compared to the detriment of the web site owner. Under this 
approach, the value of the research may appear to exceed the relatively small detriment to 
a given web site owner. Obtaining consent manually is laborious, negating the advantage 
of the automated research technology, and potentially deterring a good deal of beneficial 
research. As in the Feist case or in copyright fair use, a public policy cost/benefit analysis 
might well permit unauthorized automated research activity in the absence of consent due 
to the overall public benefit – but again, this may be at the cost of using web site owners 
or their property as a means to general public benefit. 
But at a different level, that of an individual researcher, a cost-benefit analysis 
may yield quite a different result. That is, to put the point on it: researchers may choose 
to respect the rights of web server owners – not because those rights are paramount (the 
deontological argument), but because from a utilitarian, cost-benefit approach, the 
potential costs of violating those rights might be greater than a researcher would 
prudently risk. A risk-averse conclusion at the level of individual calculation may treat 
the rights of the web site owner as a fait accompli, to the detriment of the general good of 
society, and ironically, in essential alignment with the outcome under a deontological 
view of the rights of the web site owner.  In addition, there is a strong thread of ethical 
“good Samaritanism” in Internet research ethics – i.e., instances in which researchers go 
above and beyond the minimal requirements of given ethical codes and extant laws, in 
order, for example, to respect what they see as important expectations concerning 








complicates their research efforts, and, in some instances, may even run the risk of 
canceling the research project entirely.2  
The Informed Consent Model 
In a different context, Amy Bruckman and James Hudson have argued that such costs are 
part of a larger set of reasons for exempting researchers from requesting informed consent 
with regard to at least certain forms of online research, such as chatrooms (2004). As 
noted above, this is characteristic of U.S.-based approaches to research ethics are 
typically, though not exclusively, utilitarian. So, in the U.S., exemptions to an otherwise 
primary obligation, such as seeking informed consent, are often justified in utilitarian, 
cost-benefit terms. By contrast, such exemptions are much harder to justify in the 
European and Scandinavian contexts. On the contrary, the strongly deontological cast of 
research ethics – most notably, in Norway (National Committee for Research Ethics in 
the Social Sciences and the Humanities [NESH], 2001, 2003) – emphasize first of all a 
range of Human Subjects protections that must be satisfied for research to be undertaken. 
These protections are absolute in the sense that they cannot be overridden by an argument 
that the possible benefits of any research that would violate these protections would be 
sufficiently significant to the majority of society. 
To be sure, on both sides of the Atlantic, social scientists recognize the problem 
that adequately informing a subject of the purposes of a research project may change the 
subject’s behavior in ways that invalidate the study. And for this reason, modified 
informed consent as well as exemptions under some circumstances are judged as ethically 
allowable – for example, an initial, but incomplete – possibly deceptive – description of 
the experiment, followed by a more complete disclosure at the conclusion of the 
experiment, with the subject having the option of refusing to allow his/her data included 
at that stage. 
Such debates track several of the issues identified in relation to automated data 
retrieval, and the general issue of consent appear to be an attractive point of congruence 
                                                 
2 "Good Samaritan ethics" is a notion introduced by Judith Jarvis Thomson in her landmark article (1971). 
For an example of how one researcher decided to stop her research in order to contact a young woman who 
had left information on her homepage that could have resulted in direct harm, see Løfberg (2003). For 








between legal and ethical obligations. Under Western ethical practice, we typically 
consider consent of the subject to be both a cure for imposition of harms or risks in 
research and as a validation of the research subject’s autonomy; assuming that the subject 
is competent to make such choices, we respect the subject’s right to assume or decline 
research risks. This closely follows Western models of contractual assent, which assumes 
that a competent individual is in the best position to choose or decline legally binding 
obligations -- indeed, the same consent form typically serves to deal with both ethical and 
legal research obligations. Assent to automated data retrieval from web sites would 
presumably cure both ethical and legal objections to contact by data collection bots. 
The analogy to informed consent has been previously analyzed in regard to on-
line technical practices, including some that implicate the issue of trespass.  Millet et al. 
(2001) have argued that informed consent principles should apply to the placement of 
“cookie” files on the computers of users who access web sites where cookie technology is 
used to identify users and their preferences, and have analyzed the compliance of 
successive browser versions with such principles. Although unconsented cookie 
placement could be deemed a form of trespass, (Siebecker, 2003) the major concern of 
these analyses is the potential for such cookie deployment to invade privacy by creating 
user profiles and track user activities across co-operating websites. Specifically, these 
studies recommend use of informed consent in order to address the otherwise 
unconsented gathering of personal, personally identifiable information that cookie 
technology could collect without giving web browser users the opportunity to understand 
what information was collected and how it was to be used, as well as the opportunity to 
accept or decline to participate in such information collection.  
Differentiating Automated Data Retrieval 
The type of automated data gathering using bots considered here may be said to differ 
markedly from the cookie situation, in both technical and ethical characteristics. Unlike 
cookie placement, which deposits a file on an individual computer to mark computer 
personal and personally identifiable activity that would be otherwise unobserved, 
automated software data collection bots deployed for research request from another 








identifiable. Thus no alteration is made to the state of the code on the crawled server, and 
the danger of personal information collection is greatly diminished if not altogether 
absent. While the individual and personally identifiable nature of cookie activity lends 
itself to an application of informed consent, it is not at all clear that such an extension of 
informed consent is appropriate in the use of research ‘bots. The public and impersonal 
nature of research bot activity means that no credible threat to the autonomy or personal 
integrity of an individual is present in the case of automated data retrieval. 
Indeed, it may make sense to distinguish between treating a web site owner (or 
any individual) as a means to an end, as opposed to treating their property as a means to 
an end – which presumably it is, even for them. As we have noted, property, whether 
tangible chattel or intellectual property are viewed in the U.S. as largely as instrumental 
creations, developed for utilitarian purposes in the first instance. Some Hegellian models 
of property suggest that some certain types of property may have a basis in the 
individual’s personhood, where the property is integral to their individuality or 
personality – a wedding ring, for example.  (Radin, 1982)  But even under a Hegellian 
model, it seems somewhat far-fetched, to argue that web pricing data is strongly bound 
up with someone’s personal identity. Absent a strong “personality” theory to animate a 
deontological approach, an approach that balances property interests against the public 
good may seem more attractive. 
Moreover, given that many or most of the web sites that will be the subject of 
automated data retrieval are corporate in nature, the question of personhood in turn raises 
the question as to whether corporations, as juridical “persons” deserve the degree of 
respect that we would accord to natural persons. Do we need to worry about using 
corporations as means to an end?  The law typically treats corporations as equivalent to 
natural persons for a variety of limited purposes, i.e., they have the right to own property, 
the “right” to be criminally liable and punished via fines (which implies moral autonomy, 
in order to be punished for improper choices), at least a limited right to engage in free 
speech under the First Amendment, etc. On the other hand, they are treated as persons for 
only limited purposes, and do not share many of the other legal recognitions of natural 








counsel, no right to basic social services, etc. Consequently, the legal signals are at best 
mixed as to the extent to which corporate “personhood” deserves moral respect. 
Given that corporations are by definition entirely instrumental, created as means 
to an end – for the management and increase of shareholder investments – it is unclear 
how we can consider them as ends in themselves. It may be that, again instrumentally, we 
should treat them or their activity with some degree of respect as a means of respecting 
the status of the individuals who comprise the corporation. There is some precedent for 
this in the area of American First Amendment jurisprudence, where the corporation’s 
right to speak is largely derivative of the interests of the underlying group of 
shareholders. But in such cases the corporation serves merely as an instrument for 
expressing the rights of natural persons, so that a strong identification of personhood with 
corporate property seems unlikely, suggesting that both the corporate entity and corporate 
property might properly be treated on a utilitarian basis. 
Conclusion 
In this case, by recasting the ethical obligations of the researchers within this larger 
framework, we hope to bring into sharp focus the contrast between certain aspects of the 
law as utilitarian, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, different and contrasting 
aspects of the emerging law regarding servers as chattel, the “robot.txt” specification and 
its affiliated practices as deontological. Stating the point in this way, we hope, makes 
clear, that the conflict between the U.S. practice of exempting some research from the 
requirement of informed consent when risks are low and costs are high, and a European, 
especially Scandinavian insistence on informed consent as one of several human subjects 
protections, no matter the cost, is a conflict at a first level only. If left at this level, the 
conflict would remain an irresolvable either/or: either the U.S. is right or the 
Scandinavian countries are right – but not both, so that one would be forced to choose 
between them.  
By contrast, at a second “meta-level” – this conflict can be resolved in an 
interesting way: As we have suggested, when viewed at this more fruitful “meta-level,” 
substantial questions exist as to the applicability of deontological approaches outside the 








software bots.  Claims to personhood - and thus to deontological rights of a near-absolute 
sort - on the part of corporations is not fully persuasive; rather, the status of corporations 
as persons is only partial - and this for utilitarian rather than deontological reasons.  This 
suggests in turn that the more utilitarian considerations regarding benefits of research 
should come into play at a first level: utilitarian research benefits outweigh any rights 
corporations may have, at least as "persons."  Most importantly they may outweigh rights 
to informed consent, because, second, in this instance, at a meta-level the utilitarian 
considerations outweigh the deontological claims. 
If such an analysis leads us to accept the primacy of the utilitarian approach, this 
in turn suggests that by taking up this framework, we indeed move beyond conflicts on a 
first level that might otherwise seem intractable.  In an important sense, there is no 
conflict, because each ethical conclusion follows from different ethical premises, either 
utilitarianism or deontology.  By moving to the meta-level, as we hoped, we are able to 
argue for a resolution to the first-level conflict and particular issue raised by automated 
data gathering techniques - a resolution that should be fruitful insofar as it offers 
researchers ethical guidance on the use robots without asking for informed consent while 
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